This thesis utilises Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty (slightly adapted), together with rational choice methodology, to examine recent conflicts between Labour Party members and leadership. I use an iterated game structure to look at the options available to both sets of actors, the costs of those options, and thus the likely actions and outcomes. My conclusions are, broadly, that there is likely to be little gain for the leadership in paying attention to members' complaints, and that members are, ultimately, likely to remain within the party, despite their concerns.
The thesis looks at the disagreements between Labour members and the party leadership over the direction of the party. I look at the possible outcomes of different actions for both sides of the dispute. Although there is some use of " technical " ideas, I did my best to explain them before using them, so it should be comprehensible to a non-politics-student. That's the aim, anyway.
| Chapter 1 | Introduction |
| Chapter 2 | Exit, Voice, and Loyalty |
| Chapter 3 | From Labour Party to New Labour |
| Chapter 4 | Evaluation |
| Chapter 5 | Comparison with Ken Livingstone and the London Mayoralty |
| Chapter 6 | Conclusion |
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