It seems that, although there are theoretically voice options available to Labour Party members who disagree with the leadership, they will not produce the desired effect. The leadership appears to have reorganised the party internal structure in order to give less say to ordinary members, whilst claiming a greater democratisation of the party. Although OMOV in theory does increase the power of ordinary members to express their opinions, the problem is that it allows them to do so only in yes/no terms, or by choosing between a shortlist of candidates for a post. What it does not allow - and what the leadership appear to have tried to ensure does not happen - is for ordinary members to express their opinions more subtly. They do not have the power to create policy to be voted on, or to discuss a given policy (such as the manifesto): the choice is between acceptance or rejection, which is likely to push most members towards acceptance (since they have no say in the next offering either, that could easily be worse, so what would rejecting the policy achieve?). Nor do they have the power to determine shortlists, or even necessarily to select a candidate for their own constituencies (as witness the controversy in 1995 when Leeds North selected Liz Davies as their parliamentary candidate, but were told by the NEC that this was not permitted).
One can argue that the purpose of Conference, of the National Policy Forum,
and of the constituency representatives on the NEC, is to enable members to
put forward more subtle views to the leadership, and to give an opportunity
for their input into discussion of policy matters. However, as discussed
in Chapters 3 and 4, this does not seem to be successful. Whilst the NEC
does have four Grassroots Alliance constituency representatives who aim to
represent the views of ordinary members, this is an insufficient number to
make a major difference in votes or discussions on the NEC. Similarly, the
National Policy Forum is also biased against the constituency delegates,
and Conference is increasingly stage-managed to be a public relations
affair, rather than providing a real forum for discussion, as Tony Benn
commented:
"The Labour Party's annual conference has been re-organised to minimise the
role of delegates, limit the number of resolutions that can be sent in, and
use the event as a stage for the parliamentary leaders to present their
achievements, with the minimum risk of criticism from the floor."[1]
Thus, the voice options available to discontented members are essentially
ineffective.
The second reason why discontented members are unlikely to achieve any major changes in the party is connected with the exit option. The main weapon that members have is the threat to withdraw their support for the next General Election. Although elections can be fought without significant support on the ground, it was concluded in Chapter 2 that this is certainly not advisable. However, this threat of exit is likely to be ultimately empty. Those who leave the Labour Party have nowhere else to go, as there is no significant, electable left-wing party in this country. Thus, their decision would have to be to withdraw from active participation in politics altogether. Not only is this likely to be an unpalatable decision for people who tend to care deeply about politics (having no possibility of influencing political policy is worse than having little possibility), but it also has other consequences. Since there is no left- wing alternative, the removal of support from Labour would be likely to help the Conservatives regain power. However disappointed members may be with Labour's actions, they would still prefer a New Labour to a Conservative government. Hence, ultimately members are unlikely to decide to leave, nor are they even likely to refuse to campaign.
This means that it would not make sense for the leadership to pay attention to the members' discontent. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the options are fairly simple. The leadership could make concessions to the dissatisfied members - this would prevent exits, and increase members' enthusiasm in local campaigning (the benefits). However, the benefits are likely to be small, since the likelihood of significant numbers exiting is small, and members are likely to campaign regardless. The losses, however, could be very significant. The leadership clearly feel that the policies which members want would be unpopular with the electorate. They would also be seen to be vulnerable to pressure from `radicals' and `extremists'. These factors together might well lose Labour the next election. The possible costs clearly outweigh the benefits. Alternately, ignoring discontent has the possible cost of some exit and some decrease in local campaigning - but, as discussed in Chapter 4, neither of these are likely to be significant. The gains, on the other hand, are clear - maintaining control over the party and retaining voter-friendly policies, to maximise the chances of remaining in power. The obvious decision from the leadership's point of view is to ignore the complaints. This is, of course, made easier for them by the ineffectiveness of the voice options available to members, and the increased central control of the party. Tony Benn argued that the modernisers' aim is to ensure that `all effective power in the party will be vested in a new elite around the leadership'[2], which appears to be happening quite successfully. Thus, the leadership cannot be forced to pay attention to the members.
Looking back at the two possible game-theoretic analyses of the situation in Chapter 1, it is clear that it is the first option given there which describes the case in Britain. This is where the leadership's preferences are:
[3: keep policy & members] > [2: change policy] > [3: lose members]
and the members' preferences are:
[4: change policy] > [3: remain in party but attempt change] > [2: remain in party without attempting change] > [1: leave party without attempting change]
This gives the following tree:
_(3,3)
Loyalty |
__________|
__Members__|
| |_________
Ignore | Exit |
_______| |__ (1,1)
|
Voice __ Leadership ___|
____________________| |
| | Change
| Exit |_________________(4,2)
Members---------------------------(1,1)
|
|_______________________
Loyalty |_(2,3)
The diagram can then be read backwards. At the last stage of the game, members would choose loyalty over exit (3>1). Going back one stage, the leadership thus stand to gain a better outcome by ignoring them than by changing (3>1). At the initial stage, the membership would still prefer voice (leading to an outcome of 3) to either exit (outcome 1) or loyalty (outcome 2). Hence, the members will choose voice, the leadership will ignore them, and the members will choose loyalty over exit despite the lack of change.
Comparing this with the other possible analysis, the difference is in the presence of a viable alternative. It is the lack of such an alternative which means that members prefer not to exit, even if changes are not made. This is the crucial factor which means that the membership cannot pressure the leadership into making policy changes.
One obvious question is why members continue to attempt to utilise voice options. It is clear that they are not having success - moreover, it should be clear to them that they will not have any success (by the reasoning above). By using voice, then, they are incurring costs in time and energy without receiving any material benefits. This seems not to be rational behaviour. However, this can be explained in terms of expressive benefits. By complaining, instead of staying silent, members can salve their political conscience - they are not merely watching their party change (as they see it) for the worse, but are trying to save it. They cannot be blamed. There is also an attitude that if you do not complain, it is certain that nothing will change - if you do, it might. In addition, there are issues of solidarity and fraternity - groups of disaffected members are likely to act together. The process of using voice can also be enjoyable. These expressive benefits, however, are likely to lessen in value over time, as members become increasingly disillusioned. This makes it likely that over time, the weighting against the initial choice of silent loyalty will be likely to alter, since members will have tried voice and be aware that it is unsuccessful. After a certain number of iterations, it is possible that silent loyalty may become the preferred option. This will, however, clearly not affect the leadership, since from their point of view there is no difference between the two outcomes.
It seems, then, that the Labour leadership do now have sufficient power to be able to ignore their members. Neither voice nor exit are valid choices for Labour Party members; they are left with loyalty.
| [1] | Tony Benn, Tribune, 3.4.1998 |
|---|---|
| [2] | Tony Benn, Tribune, 3.4.1998 |