The two groups of actors affecting each others' actions are the party members and the party leadership. What each chooses to do becomes part of the probability/cost evaluation of the other. I will consider separately the factors influencing each group's decisions to act, but it must be noted that they overlap significantly.
The first factor which dissatisfied members must consider is the cost of the voice option, and its likelihood of success. Voicing one's opinion is not particularly difficult, but doing so successfully (or even increasing the probability of success) is significantly harder, and thus more costly in terms of effort and time. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several possible avenues for voice.
One available voice option is the National Policy Forum (NPF). However, there are several problems with this. Firstly, the ballot for local party representation on the NPF in 1998 was restricted to 1997 Conference delegates - so not all party members would be able to influence the composition of the NPF, but would have to rely on their local party representatives. Secondly, the actual influence both of constituency delegates on the NPF, and of the NPF on policy, appears to be limited, as discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, this option, while potentially (and theoretically) promising, seems not in fact to be particularly useful. The costs may well outweigh the benefits. There is also the problem, for any delegate mandated to express opinions contrary to the leadership line, of being labelled as a "troublemaker" and affecting their own future in the party.
A further possible voice option is Conference: either submitting a resolution, and/or attending as a delegate to vote on resolutions. However, recently, as discussed in the previous chapter, this has become a significantly less useful option. Delegates have less power, and the leadership does their best to ensure that "difficult" resolutions do not reach the Conference floor. The fringe meetings are also used as an avenue for voice, but these are very easy for the leadership to dismiss as minority affairs. This year, party members appear to have decided that their best possible voice option at Conference is to refuse to attend.
Another potential route for voice is the NEC - specifically, the constituency representatives. In 1998, four of the constituency representatives elected (on an OMOV membership vote) were from the Grassroots Alliance. This in itself can be seen as a voice option - the members were voting against the leadership line. However, since then, the Grassroots Alliance NEC members have had some trouble in having their opinion recognised. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the leadership attitude is that the NEC should represent the leadership to the members, whereas the Grassroots Alliance aim to do the reverse. Whilst this does in theory give members a voice, and whilst the Grassroots Alliance have tried hard to convey members' dissatisfaction, they have had real problems in managing to do so. This clearly reduces the effectiveness of this particular avenue for voice. However, it does demonstrate the use of the strategy of utilising the gaps in the party structure. Activists have observed the possibility of taking part directly in a vital section of the party leadership structure, and have mobilised to take advantage of this. This approach seems likely to be the most promising one in terms of effectiveness of voice.
One means external to the Labour Party structure that members can use to convey their views is printed material. The newspaper Tribune is the most obvious - and most widely used - form. However, it is unlikely that complaints expressed here will receive attention in terms of real changes being made as a result. The problem is precisely that this is the usual channel. Tribune is recognised as the voice of the dissatisfied left; it does not therefore demonstrate a wider, more general discontent. The use of Tribune does, however, enable dissatisfied members to communicate their opinions to others who agree with them, and thus attempt to organise. In addition to Tribune, dissatisfied members can produce their own pamphlets and booklets, such as the Independent Labour Network's `May Day Manifesto'[1]. However, these are likely to be even less successful as a means of changing the attitudes of the government than articles in Tribune - again, their only real purpose is to communicate with others who are also dissatisfied. In this context, it is worth noting that there are two different types of voice - vertical voice (i.e. complaining upwards, to the leadership in this case), and horizontal voice (i.e. complaining sideways, to other members). From this point of view, Tribune and the assorted self-produced pamphlets could be seen as quite a successful form of voice, in that they alert members to the fact that others agree with them, and thus also strengthen their support. However, their direct impact on the leadership is likely to be minimal.
A further important issue influencing members' behaviour is whether there are in fact any available alternatives, should they decide to leave Labour. Other possible party political alternatives include the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, the Socialist Labour Party, the Socialist Workers, and a variety of other small party groups. It seems highly unlikely that any Labour Party members dissatisfied with New Labour would see the Conservatives as a likely potential alternative: given that Labour has been moving towards the Conservatives recently, rather than away from them, no one who preferred the Conservatives to New Labour would have joined Labour in the first place. This opinion is reinforced by the fact that New Labour is now trying to recruit middle-of-the-road Conservatives! Clearly, the overlap is between New Labour and the Conservatives, rather than Old Labour and the Conservatives. The situation seems to be similar with the Liberal Democrats, since New Labour have moved from old Labour towards the sort of middle ground occupied by them. Labour members dissatisfied with New Labour are likely to be on the left of the party, since New Labour are on the right of it. On the other hand, Kitschelt has pointed out that the political spectrum need not be divided only left/right; it can become two-dimensional with the addition of an axis ranging from authoritarian to libertarian. He suggests that if this second axis becomes the main one, i.e. if parties cease to be divided so clearly on a left/right basis, previously left-wing supporters may well in fact move towards more liberal parties such as the Liberal Democrats.
The Socialist Labour Party, the Socialist Workers, or any of the other small socialist parties, might well be more ideologically suitable for dissatisfied Labour Party members. However, the major disadvantage to these parties is their size and political credibility. None of them are really to be considered electable, and hence provide no real alternative to Labour. Other disadvantages include their commitment to revolutionary socialism, which many Labour Party members would disagree with, and also the high cost of membership (for example, the level of commitment and time required). Although some may feel strongly enough to move to these parties, the likelihood of their ever making a significant political impact is extremely minimal. There is also the option available of forming one's own party - however, again, this is likely to be extremely high-cost, and the likelihood of achieving real political power is tiny. For a Labour Party member who wants a government to the left of New Labour, therefore, the best option seems to be to attempt to move Labour left. The question of political power would also prevent movement to the Liberal Democrats - if both New Labour and the Liberal Democrats are to be considered as `second best' options (compared with an old Labour government), there is little impetus to choose the less powerful of the two options. The crucial point is the decision between a Conservative government and a New Labour government. This problem applies in Britain in particular, due to our voting system. In countries where the Left is faced with a similar situation (i.e. the mainstream socialist party is moving to the right), but which have some form of PR voting system, there are more realistic left-wing options.
It should also be borne in mind that there are costs to exiting, especially for a party member who has previously been heavily involved in the party. Not only do they lose any chance of having any influence on party policy (however minimal that influence may be), but they also lose the sense of camaraderie or fraternity, an important private benefit.
The influence of loyalty is also an important factor in terms of a political party. This can, as discussed in Chapter 2, be interpreted in two ways: loyalty as a factor affecting the exit/voice decision; and loyalty as a particular option. As an option, it has some clear benefits - minimal cost in terms of personal time and effort, and increased likelihood of gaining elected office (locally or nationally). However, there are also costs, in that someone who remains loyal despite disagreement increases the likelihood of their having to live with an `imperfect' party. The fewer the voices of discontent, the smaller the chance of change. This makes the active choice of loyalty for a dissatisfied party member quite difficult, at least initially - they are making a choice to settle for an imperfect situation without any attempt to change it, although it may be that some members would consider this choice acceptable due to the benefits attached. The choice may become less difficult if it becomes clear that voice will not achieve anything - at this point, a party member may choose loyalty rather than exit. Indeed, in a situation where there is no exit option, loyalty might be seen as the most rational option. There is the possibility of punishment for too-vocal disagreement, ultimately the chance of being thrown out of the party - and if members are choosing not to exit, this implies that they would not wish to be forced to leave. An interesting example of this sort of decision is the lack of public support for Ken Livingstone in his campaign for London Mayor, after the leadership threat to expel any Labour members who supported him. The rationality of the choice of loyalty, however, depends on the likely reaction of the leadership to voice options (further discussed later).
Looking at loyalty as a factor affecting the exit/voice decision, someone who has been a long-term member of the Labour Party is likely to feel quite strongly about what its direction should be, and also to feel sufficiently loyal to the party (or, possibly, to their idea of what the party should, or could, be) to be prepared to put in the effort to redirect it if they feel that redirection is necessary. Such actors may also be prepared to continue making such an effort even after it becomes apparent that the effect is negligible. Loyalty in this sense may also be connected to some of the private benefits of party membership - the camaraderie, for example. There may be an impetus to stay within the party if one's friends are also involved. This loyalty is also linked to how much party members would suffer if New Labour were to continue in power, as opposed either to the Conservatives, or to a return to old Labour.
This last issue is part of the supply and demand problem. Party members both help to construct the party, and are affected by its decisions and policies, especially when, as in the current situation, the party is in power (i.e. any citizen of this country will be affected by New Labour’s current policy decisions, whether or not they are a member of the party). This means that, when deciding how to act, party members must weigh up whether having a Conservative government would be worse than having a New Labour one. This is highly relevant to their decision, since if enough members leave, Labour’s campaign during the next general election could be seriously damaged, leaving room for the Conservatives to return - the influence of activists on the outcome of elections was discussed in Chapter 2. The absence of realistic left-wing alternatives to Labour means that the choice for the activists does become this stark. The collective action problem is also relevant here - what is the likelihood that any one individual will make the difference between a Labour victory and a Conservative one? In fact, firstly, the group of local activists would be likely to be small enough that every individual does make a discernible difference to the outcome, and feels that they do. Secondly, even were this not to be the case, the departure of an individual who had been heavily involved in the party would be likely to affect others, possibly even to cause them to leave as well (`if even X is leaving...').
The problem is that activists face a dilemma. If Labour have a strong majority, and a strong lead in the polls, and are thus likely to win an election even without strong activist campaigning, then there is no threat for the activists to hold over the leadership. However, if Labour is in a situation where they could lose an election, and activist support is thus crucial, then the activists stand to lose more if they were to carry out their threat - they could let in the Conservatives. Hence, the threat is still not credible. This ties into the idea of voice leverage. Activists gain leverage if they have something the party need - in this case, the power to make a difference in closely-contested seats. However, Labour's current high majority, and high standing in opinion polls, reduces the value of this leverage, as there is less need for activists in this situation. By the time of the election after next (probably 2005), this situation is likely to have changed, and the activists would once again gain leverage. However, this leverage is only valid if there is a realistic threat of exit behind it. Hence the importance of the lack of any realistic exit option, and the activist dilemma discussed above. There is no realistic exit threat, and hence no voice leverage, even in a situation where it would otherwise be strongest (a close-run election).
This dilemma connects with probably the most difficult part of members' evaluation of their potential actions: how will the leadership react? This is important in terms of analysing the likelihood of voice or exit options succeeding in altering the party's direction. The best way to consider this is by looking at the leadership's evaluation of its potential actions.
The party leadership need to look at what might happen if they do not respond to criticisms. The crucial question is whether dissatisfied members will leave, or whether they will continue to criticise the party's direction, but remain. This, obviously, is closely related to members' attitudes to the available alternatives - and, as discussed above, there do not seem to be any viable alternatives for left-wing members. Thus, it seems likely that the majority of members will in fact remain with the party. This likelihood is increased by the attitude of MPs and popular left-wing figures such as Ken Livingstone and Tony Benn, who urge discontented members to stay within the party.[2] Frank Allaun also made a similar comment in a Tribune piece urging the discontented not to cancel their membership: `Our job is to save the party, not destroy it'.[3]
However, even if members stay but continue to criticise, the leadership need to bear in mind the possible publicity from such disagreement. The media tends to focus on such rifts within the party, which could make Labour look less electable. Given the New Labour focus on allaying the fears of Middle England, and the fact that well-publicised complaint from the hard left could easily arouse such fears again, this would be of significant concern to the leadership. However, the fact that Labour have been in power for nearly three years so far without reacting to pressure from the hard left, could instead be seen as being in their favour. All parties have extremists; the important question is whether they are running the party (as Labour's extremists were perceived to be in the early 1980s).
The issue of whether members stay also affects another important aspect of the evaluation of leadership options - elections. If members are ignored for long enough, regardless of the lack of alternatives and the loyalty factor, they may eventually decide to leave. Even if they remain within the party, will they be prepared to campaign for a party with which they do not entirely agree? The effect of activists on election results is, as discussed in Chapter 2, quite considerable - will enough members leave, or not bother to campaign, to make that difference? This relates back to the members' attitude to the Conservatives as compared to New Labour. At election time, will they be prepared to risk the Conservatives getting back in, or will they prefer New Labour, despite the disagreements? Another factor is Labour's lead in the opinion polls. If the lead is high enough, it is possible that the activists will not be so necessary (although, of course, they would still be useful). An indication of the possible effect of a low level of activism is the recent European elections, where campaigning activity was very low, and as a result, both the voter turnout and the Labour vote in particular suffered. It must be noted, however, that European elections do tend to have a lower turnout than General Elections.
Another interesting point is the leadership's attitude to the need for activists during election campaigns. Liz Davies commented that Peter Mandelson is in fact of the opinion that activists on the ground are no longer really necessary; campaigns can instead be run entirely centrally and through the media.[4] As discussed in Chapter 2, this opinion seems to be inaccurate; but if this is what the Labour leadership think, it tends to neutralise (at least for the moment) the members' most powerful weapon. However, Labour's 1997 Campaign Handbook laid stress on the importance of constituency campaigns, quoting from Denver and Hands' work. One might think that the low level of activism for the European elections, and Labour's consequently poor showing, would have engendered concern, but so far there is no evidence to this effect. There may also be a feeling that the newer, post-1994 members may be more appropriate campaigners for New Labour - but these new members are largely quiescent, and so far have contributed significantly less to campaigning than members who joined pre-1994. However, as mentioned earlier, it seems possible that New Labour are deliberately trying to recruit this type of member. A more diffuse, less active membership means more financial benefits, but without the problems which arise from a committed and active membership. It is possible that some of the reforms were designed to push activists out. The aim would be to continue to get support at elections, but without any interference between elections. However, it is not clear that these aims are compatible, given the lack of activity, even during election campaigns, which tends to be shown by the newer members. This is particularly true for local election campaigns. The possibility that the leadership don't care about the loss of members is also a less interesting one to look at - clearly if this is the case, then no policy changes will occur. The more interesting case is whether a concern to keep members would in fact force them to make changes - and it seems that, since members have no available exit options, this will not be necessary.
Members may also be valuable to the leadership in other ways: primarily financially, and in local government. Financial issues are probably not a major concern, since most of Labour's funding comes from large donations and the trade unions, not from individual members. Local government may be more of an concern - constituency organisations are a recognised method of producing local politicians. However, it is likely that there will still be enough ambitious people who agree with New Labour for this not to be a problem. However, if the new members are less active than the pre-1994 members, this inactivity may carry over to local government.
As well as this, the leadership need to consider what happens if they do respond to criticism. Do they need to return entirely to old Labour? Or could they just make some minor changes? From a publicity point of view, caving in in this way could undo much of the careful work done to allay the fears of Middle England at electing Labour to power, and could seriously affect Labour's chances at the next General Election. Labour would be seen to be being taken over by the Left once more. Votes are definitely considered to be more important than activists; thus, the crucial trade-off is whether more votes would be lost by gaining this bad publicity, but also gaining committed activists, or by the possible loss of some activists, but avoidance of the loss of the voters' trust. John May points out that parties which give programmatic control to activists are likely to stick to ideologically pure policies, even if these prove to lose votes.[5] This seems to be exactly Labour's concern - by paying attention to the activists and acting as they would wish, they risk losing votes. Given that, as discussed above, it seems likely that the discontented members will, in the end, return and campaign for New Labour as the lesser of two evils, the obvious decision for the leadership is to sit tight and wait for the discontent to die down.
If the members evaluate the likely actions of the leadership as discussed above, voice options are ultimately pointless, although they may make members feel better. Given that, as also discussed, the available voice options do not appear to be even potentially effective, this is doubly true. Voice options are quite high-cost, without serious chances of success. The only option which might work would be to leave and not return before the next General Election, or to stay within the party but not to campaign. However, this runs the serious risk of losing the election to the Conservatives, which would be considered worse than New Labour. It seems that the members do not have any viable options.
| [1] | Michael Barratt Brown The May Day Manifesto Part 1 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1998) |
|---|---|
| [2] | Article by Ken Livingstone, Tribune, 2.1.1998 |
| [3] | Article by Frank Allaun, Tribune, 3.4.1998 |
| [4] | Liz Davies, speaking at Oxford University Labour Club meeting, 24.11.1999 |
| [5] | John May `Opinion Structure of Political Parties' Political Studies 21 (1973) |