The first thing to consider when addressing the questions mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, is what the current situation in the Labour party actually is. What opportunities do members have to express their opinions? Also, how have these changed in the modernisation process? It seems that the modernisation which, it was claimed, was intended to empower the membership, has in fact tended to have the opposite effect.
The other source of power in the party, the Party Annual Conference, is attended by delegates from constituency organisations, local government officials, and members of the PLP. In the 1918 Labour Party Constitution, the NEC is defined as the administration authority, whereas Conference's role is to direct and control the work of the party. This dual structure - NEC and Conference - gives rise to an ambiguity about the ultimate source of authority within the Labour Party.[1] This ambiguity is exacerbated by the fact that whilst the roles of the NEC and of Conference are defined in the constitution, the role of the PLP is not. In practice, this gap has tended to be filled firstly by the PLP leadership taking the initiative with the NEC to formulate and implement policy, and secondly via the NEC's very influential role in Conference. However, the way in which this informal system works has been changed in recent times by the New Labour modernisers.
The party leadership certainly aims to control elections to the NEC. However, they are not always entirely successful. Last year four members of the Grassroots Alliance (an anti-Blairite, old Labour group) was elected to the NEC despite leadership opposition, and against a leadership-endorsed slate. The leadership have, however, successfully altered the role of the NEC. Increasingly, its role has been interpreted recently as support of the PLP leadership, rather as the voice of the mass party. Changes in January 1996 emphasised this aspect of partnership. This clearly reduces the usefulness of the NEC for Labour dissidents. Liz Davies commented that `the government sees the job of the NEC [as being] to communicate the government's message to the Party... [I think] our job on the NEC is... to reflect and express the views of the party members.'[2] The Grassroots Alliance have also complained that the leadership set the agenda for NEC meetings, and are able to control to a significant extent what is and is not discussed. This is due to the fact that the majority of NEC members are `New Labour'. Hence, any opposition from the left can readily be voted down. This clearly further reduces the usefulness of the NEC as a voice option for those who disagree with leadership policy. The leadership control of the NEC also enables them to control the agenda of the main parts of Conference and thus to limit the ability of constituency delegates to criticise current party policy. This will be discussed further later.
A further aspect of the modernising changes made to the Labour Party since Kinnock became Leader of the PLP in 1983 is the change in voting structure for the election of the leader and for some policy changes. Although many significant changes were made throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the most important change was the introduction of `one member, one vote' (OMOV) in 1993 (under John Smith's leadership), removing the block vote of the Trade Unions and the constituency delegates. Trade Unions and constituencies now had to ballot their members individually, and the resulting votes were then allocated proportionally. Later, when Blair became leader after Smith's death in 1994, some votes (such as Clause 4) were put to the membership individually by postal vote. The abolition of Clause 4 was the second important turning point in the modernisation of the Labour Party.
The important question to be addressed is what avenues are available for members and activists to express their opinions, and how powerful these are. Obviously, any member can always contact the leadership directly, but this is unlikely to be particularly useful - a single voice in this context will be unlikely to have much effect. There is a distinction here between direct voice, where an individual aims to bring about the change directly by their action, and collective voice, where the individual action is intended to contribute to the desired effect. Direct voice is unlikely to be successful in this case - collective voice is needed. The problem is that, as discussed above, the institutions which run the party are all, to varying extents, controlled by the leadership of the PLP. Indeed, currently, it seems that the PLP modernisers retain control of all the party's levers of power. There are two main areas in which members can, or should be able to, have a say, which are vital to the direction of the party: the forming of policy, and MP/MEP candidate selection.
The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD), formed in the 1970s to ensure that the Labour Party did not ignore the views of individual members once in office, felt that the election manifesto should be the responsibility of the NEC, rather than the leader of the PLP (it became the leader's responsibility after 1979). However, unlike the CLPD's resolutions concerning annual obligatory re-selection of incumbent MPs, and membership participation in the election of the Party Leader (discussed later in the chapter), this reform, although successful at Conference, did not lead to any change in the constitution and the manifesto thus remained in the hands of the Party Leader. This is still true now - while the manifesto is voted on by the membership (since the introduction of OMOV), members do not have a hand in producing it in the first place. This is worth bearing in mind in terms of different types of democracy. There is an important difference between being able to choose to accept or decline a fixed statement (such as the manifesto), and being involved in defining that fixed statement, where there is room for adaption rather than wholesale rejection or acceptance. Under the current system, there tends to be a disincentive to reject a manifesto, if it is not completely unacceptable, as there is no guarantee that the next presented manifesto would be any more acceptable. Blackburn comments (concerning putting the 1997 draft manifesto to the membership) `This was not a real instance of empowering the membership since no amendment or alternative was permitted. The purpose was to bind all members and all MPs to this minimal programme and to reduce pressure for more radical measures'.[3] Seyd also argues that the yes/no ballots on Clause IV and on the manifesto summary were more of a PR exercise than a serious attempt to involve members in policy-making.[4] The low turnout (only 27% of the membership) for the Clause IV ballot may also indicate dissatisfaction with the choice given in the ballot, although it could simply imply apathy among the membership.
Another change which affects membership voice is the newly established Joint Policy Committee, which now controls policy-making, a job which used to belong to the NEC. This consists of equal numbers from the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet, together with representatives from the European Parliamentary Labour Party and local government. Again, this has clearly reduced the influence of activists on policy, thus adversely affecting their available voice options.
A crucial aspect of policy formulation recently has been the creation of the National Policy Forum (NPF) in 1998. The aim of this, according to the leadership, was to increase the amount of input that members had into policy. However, there was significant grassroots concern about this, as reported in Tribune.[5] One concern was with the ballots for local party representation on the NPF - there was no time allowed for resolving potential tied ballots. Further, only delegates to the 1997 Conference were able to vote, reducing the opportunities for ordinary members to contribute. There was also concern over how the agenda for the NPF would be decided. It was pointed out[6] that even if all 54 constituency representatives voted at the NPF for a policy position to be put to Conference, it would not get on the agenda without the support of other groups represented on the NPF (for example, the trade unions). There is also a clear imbalance of power in the NPF between the well-resourced ministerial team and other members. Initial drafts of policy documents come from ministers, and it is unclear whether later submissions can challenge the basic assumptions of these documents. Workshop discussions are also guided by, and reported on by, senior party personnel facilitators, giving them significant levels of control. The lack of communication between constituency representatives and their electorate also minimises any sense of accountability.[7] This does not seem like a viable forum for members to convey their concerns, and be listened to by the leadership. It appears that the NPF may be more of a cosmetic exercise than a real input into party policy. The party leadership chooses which parts of NPF advice it accepts and which it rejects.
Delegates from local constituency organisations (supposedly representing the opinions of their members) do still attend Conference. However, here as well their power has been reduced. At this year's conference, for example, delegates were unable to discuss a motion about Air Traffic Control privatisation, since the party leadership insisted that this policy was not due for review (under the new two-year rolling programme of policy review) until 2000. This was despite the fact that privatisation was being mooted as a possible occurrence before the next review occurred! Similarly, other motions put forward by delegates were not discussed. This yea, 1/3 of constituency parties have chosen not to send delegates to Conference, in protest at how Labour is ignoring its grass-roots and core vote.[8] This can be seen either as exit (of a limited sort), or, more usefully, as voice.
Two successful reforms made by the CLPD were to ensure that MPs had to be re-selected by their constitution organisation every year, and that the Party Leader should be elected by more than just the PLP. This aimed to redress the balance of power between parliamentarians and members.
The NEC has always had significant powers to control the choice of parliamentary constituency candidates, both by controlling the shortlist and by retaining the power of veto over the choice made by a constituency party. The leadership control of the NEC can thus be used to ensure that candidates are sympathetic to New Labour, and again reduces the power of members to influence the party. An example of this power was during the selection of candidates for the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections. Due to the PR system used for these votes, a list of candidates had to be provided for each region. However, as well as this, the NEC also chose to use a regional list system for the selection of candidates. This meant that the members were able to have a say only in the nomination of candidates, with the leadership would be making the final decision. The leadership also had further power in terms of the order in which candidates were placed on the ballot paper - the further down the candidate, the less likely he or she would be to be elected (due to the voting system which was used). This enabled the leadership to handicap candidates whom they did not like, without overtly banning them. In the same elections, however, two former MEPs (Hugh Kerr and Ken Coates) were banned, having been expelled from the Labour Party for public disagreement with the party line.
From one point of view, it might be said that individual members have more say in party matters since the modernisation. They do, after all, all have a vote under OMOV. However, as I mentioned above, if the only voice they have is a yes/no decision on a particular statement or issue, there is no room for them to attempt to change policy, nor for shades of opinion. Certainly, if members have OMOV together with the ability to put input into policy decisions, that is an increased voice option from the previous block vote situation. This, however, is not the current situation, and arguably, OMOV in the current context is less valuable than the previous ability to discuss policy in Conference and via a freer NEC. This is especially true due to the control of the leadership over mass membership ballots. Individual members or constituency organisations cannot call a national party ballot; that right belongs only to the NEC., which also has control over the wording of any membership ballot - something that can clearly have a crucial effect on the outcome of a vote. Since the NEC is, as discussed, currently under leadership control, this effectively gives these powers to the leadership. A further point is that the exact use of OMOV is not enshrined in the constitution. An illustration of this is the ballot for the London mayoral candidate selection, where not only were MPs given 1/3 of the vote (the trade unions and individual members also having 1/3), thus making their votes significantly more valuable, but also trade unions were not required to ballot their members - thus returning in effect to the discredited block vote.
One aspect of the modernisation is the switch from emphasis on activists to emphasis on `ordinary members'. More important than either of these to the Labour Party, though, is the ordinary voter - their members alone are not sufficient to get them into office. However, it is important to remember that the link between the activists and the voters is very strong, as discussed in Chapter 2. Having a significant activist campaign can make the difference between winning and losing an election. On the other hand, if a party's policies are completely at odds with the mood of the country, any number of activists will not get the party elected. The problem is that this is a difficult tightrope to walk. The Labour Party seems to have decided to err significantly on the side of the ordinary voters, rather than on that of the activists, feeling that the two sides are not compatible. In order to do this, they seem to have tightened the central control of the party to a point where it seems that the activists no longer can make a real difference.
| [1] | P Seyd The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left (Macmillan, 1987): p4 |
|---|---|
| [2] | Tribune, 20.11.1998 |
| [3] | Blackburn `Reflections on Blair's Velvet Revolution', New left Review 223 (1997): p15 |
| [4] | P Seyd `New Parties/New Politics?': p389 |
| [5] | Tribune, 9.1.1998 |
| [6] | Tribune, 27.11.1998 |
| [7] | P Seyd `New Parties/New Politics?': p393 |
| [8] | Guardian, 14.4.2000 |