Previous | Index | Next

Chapter 5
Ken Livingstone & the London Mayoral Contest

The issue of Ken Livingstone and the London mayoral contest provides an interesting comparison of a case where leadership and members disagree, and which has worked differently from the national party case. Livingstone was originally against having a London Mayor at all, but when the referendum returned a Yes vote in 1998, he began to indicate his interest in standing. The Labour leadership were unhappy about this, and there were several attempts to remove him from the competition. Originally, the possibility was that Livingstone would be left off the shortlist, in which case there was a strong likelihood that he would stand as an independent. However, after much discussion, he was put on it. The electoral college, which was set up by the Labour leadership specifically for this election, was balanced in a way intended to disadvantage Livingstone, since most of his support was from individual members. MPs, trade unions, and London Labour Party members each made up 1/3 of the electoral college. This means that an MP's vote counted for significantly more than the vote of an ordinary party member. In addition, trade unions were not forced to ballot their members, thus effectively returning to the block vote system. In fact, almost all trade unions did ballot members, and a high proportion of them voted for Livingstone, at least in part (most trade union votes were split according to each candidate's percentage of the ballot).

The results were in the end very close, and split as follows[1]:

After this round, Jackson's votes were redistributed:

Whilst this meant that Dobson became the Labour candidate, it also meant that he had won with a total of only 20,000 votes against Livingstone's 70,000, thus clearly demonstrating the effect of the electoral college weighting system. A week after the result was announced, Livingstone decided to stand as an independent. He was immediately warned that he would be expelled from the party (as he was, on the day that nominations closed), and that any Labour Party member who publicly supported him would also be expelled. Livingstone, in his statement explaining why he would be standing, urged Labour Party members not to leave the party in order to support him: `I want to make it absolutely clear that I do not want anybody to leave the Labour Party. Members who have been appalled by the conduct of Labour's selection must stay and fight to ensure that nothing like this ever happens again.'[2]

At the time of writing, it seems almost certain that Livingstone will win. The polls immediately after his announcement of his candidature gave his support as 68%, with Dobson's as 13%.[3] More recent polls give a smaller, but still seemingly insurmountable lead (Livingstone 49%, Dobson 15%)[4]. The question is, why did the New Labour leadership try so hard to keep him out of the contest, and has their strategy failed?

The Labour leadership did not wish Livingstone to stand primarily because of his unpreparedness to toe the party line; they felt that a Labour mayor who disagreed with New Labour would cause the government far too many difficulties, in both political and public relations terms. The major disagreement between them, in fact, concerns the Tube. Labour wish to fund the Tube by a public-private partnership; Livingstone has instead suggested a public bond scheme. By the time of the shortlist, this was the only point on which Livingstone remained obdurate: he had moved towards New Labour on everything else, in an attempt to get the Labour nomination. However, he had made it clear that, if elected, he would do what he felt was best for London rather than sticking firmly to the party line. This was why the leadership were unhappy about the possibility of his selection as the Labour candidate.

This may seem similar to the national situation - a left-winger who disagreed with the leadership, and who had suffered repeated attempts to block him. However, there are significant differences. Firstly, New Labour were not able to block Livingstone from standing for nomination, despite his continued intransigence on the issue of the Tube. Indeed, the attempts at blocking him, and his insistence on standing, were something of a public relations disaster for New Labour. Both the idea of a public- private partnership for the Tube and New Labour's attempts at ever-tighter central control were highlighted and proved unpopular with the public. New Labour were in the end forced by these considerations to allow Livingstone onto the shortlist - encouraged by Dobson, who did not wish Livingstone to be excluded. Secondly, they were unable to stop him from standing as an independent, although they did successfully deny him the Labour nomination. The important point here is that Livingstone is a viable prospect as an independent (this was known before the nomination contest: a poll in the Guardian[5] just before the shortlist was chosen showed that, even as an independent, Livingstone would win (although in that case it would go to two rounds; as a Labour candidate, he would win on the first round)). This means that there is a realistic left-wing alternative to New Labour, unlike the national situation.

The crucial difference between the London Mayor and the national case is this presence of a viable alternative. Thus, a failure to support Frank Dobson as the Labour candidate would not let the Tories in - the decision is no longer between New Labour and the Tories. However, the circumstances producing this alternative seem unique to this situation. Firstly, there is the factor of Ken Livingstone himself. Not only is he personally charismatic, but he is also undoubtedly popular within London, and with a wide political range of Londoners. His previous experience as leader of the GLC is helpful in this context - during his time at the GLC, Labour's poll rating in London went up, at a time when in the rest of the country it was going down. None of the national left-wing parties have this sort of public support and popularity. Potentially, another party could be set up - but even if it were to be led by Livingstone and other similar politicians, it is unlikely that it would be as popular as Livingstone is on his own for this particular post. The mayoralty is an individual post, and Livingstone has already demonstrated his competence in this field. A new party would be untried in government, and would not have the sort of individual profile that Livingstone has. Part of the support for Livingstone is also possibly because there is a wish not to have the government's choice of mayor in power - and Livingstone is not the government's choice. This is obviously different in the national case. The support for Livingstone - although forced now to be largely tacit - can also be seen as a form of voice for London Labour Party members. 96% of the membership voted in the electoral college, a huge figure compared to the 27% who voted in the ballot on Clause IV. This implies that the vote was being used as a form of protest. Indeed, the fact that Livingstone has chosen to stand at all can be seen as a form of voice - he is standing on behalf of those who are not satisfied with New Labour.

The crucial difference is undoubtedly the presence of a viable left-wing alternative; but this alternative is available for reasons that preclude its being transferred into the national situation. In other words, the Livingstone issue does not give discontented members any hope in national terms, although it does illustrate the vital factor of having an alternative. It is also notable that even in this situation, party members have by and large chosen not to leave the party. This may be partly because Livingstone seems not to need their help in order to get elected - but it may also be because they are aware that there is still no national alternative.

Given this, why were the leadership so keen to stop Livingstone? After all, his candidacy does not materially affect the situation in a national sense, in that it neither increases the effectiveness of voice in the national party context, nor offers a possible national alternative to which significant numbers of activists might be lost. Thus, it might not seem worth their while to alienate party members and gain bad press over their `control freakery'. However, it is important to bear in mind the reasons why the leadership will not give in to discontented members on the national level. The point is that the losses from not giving in will be negligible, and the gains significant. When the leadership were making decisions about Livingstone, there were two potential outcomes. The first possibility was that he could win the Labour nomination (something that initially looked unlikely, although later seemed more likely). In this case, the leadership would have retained the activity of party members during the mayoral campaign (a gain), but would have demonstrated an inability to control the party (a significant loss), and more importantly, given that Labour would then almost certainly win the mayoral election, they would have been faced with a nominally Labour mayor who would, at least on some issues, stand against the party, thus demonstrating internal divisions. The fear which motivated them is clear: Livingstone would take Labour back to its 1980s days of unelectability in the eyes of the public. From the leadership's point of view, the potential loss was immense.

The other possibility was that Livingstone could lose the selection. In this case, if Livingstone were to stand (as he now has) as an independent, Labour would be likely to lose the support of London activists during the mayoral campaign (if only because they refrain from campaigning for Dobson, even if they were not to campaign for Livingstone), and also most probably to lose the election. However, if Livingstone were to win in this situation, he would then not be a Labour candidate, and thus would not be connected with Labour's electability - he would have been `rejected by the party' and could be portrayed as a loose cannon. The activists would also be likely to return for the general Election, for the reasons outlined above. There was, of course, also the possibility that he would not stand at all, which would have been an ideal result for the leadership.

The preferable outcome for the leadership - by a significant margin - was clearly that Livingstone should not stand as the Labour candidate. Compared to the potential costs if he had won the nomination, the costs of some short-term bad publicity, and slightly more disillusionment on the part of local party members (who can be expected to support Labour in the next General Election regardless), were minimal. Thus, the rational choice for the leadership was to oppose Livingstone's selection to the highest possible extent. The fact that he has now stood, and is likely to win, does not make this strategy a failure. New Labour seem genuinely convinced that he will not be a popular mayor once he is in office. In this situation, Livingstone is clearly not a Labour mayor, and thus cannot be used against the party, especially now he has been expelled. Whether this belief (that he will be unpopular/unsuccessful) is correct or not, based on this belief their behaviour has been entirely rational and their strategy successful. This is even more true given that very few party members have left to support Livingstone - his status as a maverick who does not represent Labour opinion has been firmly established.

Previous | Index | Next