*/
#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "build-config.h"
#include "cleankey.h"
+#include "decodekey.h"
#include "keyid.h"
#include "keystructs.h"
#include "log.h"
* hash cannot be checked (eg we don't support that hash type) we err
* on the side of caution and keep it.
*/
-int clean_sighashes(struct openpgp_publickey *key,
+int clean_sighashes(struct onak_dbctx *dbctx,
+ struct openpgp_publickey *key,
struct openpgp_packet *sigdata,
- struct openpgp_packet_list **sigs)
+ struct openpgp_packet_list **sigs,
+ bool fullverify,
+ bool *selfsig, bool *othersig)
{
struct openpgp_packet_list *tmpsig;
+ struct openpgp_publickey *sigkey = NULL;
onak_status_t ret;
uint8_t hashtype;
uint8_t hash[64];
uint8_t *sighash;
int removed = 0;
- uint64_t keyid;
+ uint64_t keyid, sigid;
+ bool remove;
+ get_keyid(key, &keyid);
+ if (othersig != NULL) {
+ *othersig = false;
+ }
+ if (selfsig != NULL) {
+ *selfsig = false;
+ }
while (*sigs != NULL) {
+ remove = false;
ret = calculate_packet_sighash(key, sigdata, (*sigs)->packet,
&hashtype, hash, &sighash);
PRIX64,
hashtype,
keyid);
- sigs = &(*sigs)->next;
- } else if (ret != ONAK_E_OK ||
+ if (fullverify) {
+ remove = true;
+ }
+ } else if (ret != ONAK_E_OK || (!fullverify &&
!(hash[0] == sighash[0] &&
- hash[1] == sighash[1])) {
+ hash[1] == sighash[1]))) {
+ remove = true;
+ }
+
+#if HAVE_CRYPTO
+ if (fullverify && !remove) {
+ sig_info((*sigs)->packet, &sigid, NULL);
+
+ /* Start by assuming it's a bad sig */
+
+ remove = true;
+ if (sigid == keyid) {
+ ret = onak_check_hash_sig(key, (*sigs)->packet,
+ hash, hashtype);
+
+ /* We have a valid self signature */
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK) {
+ remove = false;
+ if (selfsig != NULL) {
+ *selfsig = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (remove && dbctx->fetch_key_id(dbctx, sigid,
+ &sigkey, false)) {
+
+ ret = onak_check_hash_sig(sigkey,
+ (*sigs)->packet,
+ hash, hashtype);
+
+ /* Got a valid signature */
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK) {
+ remove = false;
+ if (othersig != NULL) {
+ *othersig = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free_publickey(sigkey);
+ sigkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (remove) {
tmpsig = *sigs;
*sigs = (*sigs)->next;
tmpsig->next = NULL;
return removed;
}
-int clean_list_sighashes(struct openpgp_publickey *key,
- struct openpgp_signedpacket_list *siglist)
+int clean_list_sighashes(struct onak_dbctx *dbctx,
+ struct openpgp_publickey *key,
+ struct openpgp_signedpacket_list **siglist,
+ bool fullverify, bool needother)
{
+ struct openpgp_signedpacket_list *tmp = NULL;
+ bool selfsig, othersig;
int removed = 0;
- while (siglist != NULL) {
- removed += clean_sighashes(key, siglist->packet,
- &siglist->sigs);
- siglist = siglist->next;
+ while (siglist != NULL && *siglist != NULL) {
+ selfsig = othersig = false;
+
+ removed += clean_sighashes(dbctx, key, (*siglist)->packet,
+ &(*siglist)->sigs, fullverify, &selfsig, &othersig);
+
+ if (fullverify && (!selfsig || (needother && !othersig))) {
+ /* Remove the UID/subkey if there's no selfsig */
+ tmp = *siglist;
+ *siglist = (*siglist)->next;
+ tmp->next = NULL;
+ free_signedpacket_list(tmp);
+ } else {
+ siglist = &(*siglist)->next;
+ }
}
return removed;
}
-int clean_key_sighashes(struct openpgp_publickey *key)
+int clean_key_signatures(struct onak_dbctx *dbctx,
+ struct openpgp_publickey *key, bool fullverify, bool needother)
{
int removed;
- removed = clean_sighashes(key, NULL, &key->sigs);
- removed += clean_list_sighashes(key, key->uids);
- removed += clean_list_sighashes(key, key->subkeys);
+ removed = clean_sighashes(dbctx, key, NULL, &key->sigs, fullverify,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ removed += clean_list_sighashes(dbctx, key, &key->uids, fullverify,
+ needother);
+ removed += clean_list_sighashes(dbctx, key, &key->subkeys, fullverify,
+ false);
return removed;
}
while (*curkey != NULL) {
if (policies & ONAK_CLEAN_DROP_V3_KEYS) {
if ((*curkey)->publickey->data[0] < 4) {
- /* Remove the key from the list */
+ /* Remove the key from the list if it's < v4 */
tmp = *curkey;
*curkey = tmp->next;
tmp->next = NULL;
}
count += dedupuids(*curkey);
count += dedupsubkeys(*curkey);
- if (policies & ONAK_CLEAN_CHECK_SIGHASH) {
- count += clean_key_sighashes(*curkey);
+ if (policies & (ONAK_CLEAN_CHECK_SIGHASH |
+ ONAK_CLEAN_VERIFY_SIGNATURES)) {
+ count += clean_key_signatures(dbctx, *curkey,
+ policies & ONAK_CLEAN_VERIFY_SIGNATURES,
+ policies & ONAK_CLEAN_NEED_OTHER_SIG);
}
if (count > 0) {
changed++;
}
- curkey = &(*curkey)->next;
+ if ((*curkey)->uids == NULL) {
+ /* No valid UIDS so remove the key from the list */
+ tmp = *curkey;
+ *curkey = tmp->next;
+ tmp->next = NULL;
+ free_publickey(tmp);
+ } else {
+ curkey = &(*curkey)->next;
+ }
}
return changed;
*/
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include "build-config.h"
#include "decodekey.h"
#include "keyid.h"
#include "keystructs.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "onak.h"
#include "openpgp.h"
#include "sigcheck.h"
#include "md5.h"
#include "sha1.h"
#endif
+
#include "sha1x.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <nettle/dsa.h>
+#include <nettle/ecc.h>
+#include <nettle/ecc-curve.h>
+#include <nettle/ecdsa.h>
+#include <nettle/eddsa.h>
+#include <nettle/rsa.h>
+#include "rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+/* Take an MPI from a buffer and import it into a GMP mpz_t */
+#define MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, v) \
+{ \
+ /* MPI length is stored in bits, convert it to bytes */ \
+ if (pk->length < (ofs + 2)) { \
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT; \
+ } else { \
+ len = pk->data[ofs] << 8 | pk->data[ofs + 1]; \
+ len += 7; \
+ len = len >> 3; \
+ if (pk->length < (ofs + len + 2)) { \
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT; \
+ } else { \
+ mpz_import(v, len, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs + 2]); \
+ ofs += len + 2; \
+ } \
+ } \
+}
+
+#if HAVE_CRYPTO
+
+/*
+ * Hold the crypto material for a public key.
+ * May want to move to a header at some point.
+ */
+struct onak_key_material {
+ uint8_t type;
+ union {
+ struct dsa_params dsa;
+ struct ecc_point ecc;
+ struct rsa_public_key rsa;
+ uint8_t ed25519[32];
+ };
+ mpz_t y;
+};
+
+static void onak_free_key_material(struct onak_key_material *key)
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA:
+ ecc_point_clear(&key->ecc);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA:
+ mpz_clear(key->dsa.p);
+ mpz_clear(key->dsa.q);
+ mpz_clear(key->dsa.g);
+ mpz_clear(key->y);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_ENC:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_SIGN:
+ mpz_clear(key->rsa.n);
+ mpz_clear(key->rsa.e);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the key type back to 0 to indicate we cleared it */
+ key->type = 0;
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static onak_status_t onak_parse_key_material(struct openpgp_packet *pk,
+ struct onak_key_material *key)
+{
+ int i, len, ofs;
+ enum onak_oid oid;
+ mpz_t x, y;
+ onak_status_t ret = ONAK_E_OK;
+
+ /* Clear the key type; only set it when fully parsed */
+ key->type = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Shortest valid key is v4 Ed25519, which takes 51 bytes, so do a
+ * quick sanity check which will ensure we have enough data to check
+ * the packet header and OID info.
+ */
+ if (pk->length < 51)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+
+ if (pk->data[0] != 4 && pk->data[0] != 5)
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+
+ /*
+ * MPIs are after version byte, 4 byte creation time +
+ * type byte plus length for v5.
+ */
+ ofs = (pk->data[0] == 4) ? 6 : 10;
+ switch (pk->data[5]) {
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA:
+ oid = onak_parse_oid(&pk->data[ofs], pk->length - ofs);
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_INVALID)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_NISTP256) {
+ if (pk->length - ofs != 76)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ /* Move past the OID to the key data MPI */
+ ofs += pk->data[ofs] + 1;
+ len = pk->data[ofs] << 8 | pk->data[ofs + 1];
+ if (len != 515)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (pk->data[ofs + 2] != 4)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ mpz_init(x);
+ mpz_init(y);
+ ecc_point_init(&key->ecc, nettle_get_secp_256r1());
+ ofs += 3;
+ mpz_import(x, 32, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 32;
+ mpz_import(y, 32, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 32;
+ ecc_point_set(&key->ecc, x, y);
+ } else if (oid == ONAK_OID_NISTP384) {
+ if (pk->length - ofs != 105)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ /* Move past the OID to the key data MPI */
+ ofs += pk->data[ofs] + 1;
+ len = pk->data[ofs] << 8 | pk->data[ofs + 1];
+ if (len != 771)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (pk->data[ofs + 2] != 4)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ mpz_init(x);
+ mpz_init(y);
+ ecc_point_init(&key->ecc, nettle_get_secp_384r1());
+ ofs += 3;
+ mpz_import(x, 48, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 48;
+ mpz_import(y, 48, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 48;
+ ecc_point_set(&key->ecc, x, y);
+ } else if (oid == ONAK_OID_NISTP521) {
+ if (pk->length - ofs != 141)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ /* Move past the OID to the key data MPI */
+ ofs += pk->data[ofs] + 1;
+ len = pk->data[ofs] << 8 | pk->data[ofs + 1];
+ if (len != 1059)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (pk->data[ofs + 2] != 4)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ mpz_init(x);
+ mpz_init(y);
+ ecc_point_init(&key->ecc, nettle_get_secp_521r1());
+ ofs += 3;
+ mpz_import(x, 66, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 66;
+ mpz_import(y, 66, 1, 1, 0, 0, &pk->data[ofs]);
+ ofs += 66;
+ ecc_point_set(&key->ecc, x, y);
+ } else {
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+ }
+ mpz_clear(y);
+ mpz_clear(x);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA:
+ if (pk->length - ofs != 45)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ oid = onak_parse_oid(&pk->data[ofs], pk->length - ofs);
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_INVALID)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+
+ /* Move past the OID to the key data MPI */
+ ofs += pk->data[ofs] + 1;
+
+ if (oid == ONAK_OID_ED25519) {
+ len = pk->data[ofs] << 8 | pk->data[ofs + 1];
+ if (len != 263)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ if (pk->data[ofs + 2] != 0x40)
+ return ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ ofs += 3;
+ memcpy(key->ed25519, &pk->data[ofs], 32);
+ ofs += 32;
+ } else {
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA:
+ mpz_init(key->dsa.p);
+ mpz_init(key->dsa.q);
+ mpz_init(key->dsa.g);
+ mpz_init(key->y);
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->dsa.p);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->dsa.q);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->dsa.g);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->y);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_ENC:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_SIGN:
+ mpz_init(key->rsa.n);
+ mpz_init(key->rsa.e);
+ key->rsa.size = ((pk->data[6] << 8) + pk->data[7] + 7) >> 3;
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->rsa.n);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(pk, key->rsa.e);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+ }
+
+ key->type = pk->data[5];
+
+ if (ret != ONAK_E_OK) {
+ onak_free_key_material(key);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+onak_status_t onak_check_hash_sig(struct openpgp_publickey *sigkey,
+ struct openpgp_packet *sig,
+ uint8_t *hash,
+ uint8_t hashtype)
+{
+ onak_status_t ret;
+ struct onak_key_material pubkey;
+ struct dsa_signature dsasig;
+ uint8_t edsig[64];
+ uint64_t keyid;
+ int len, ofs;
+ mpz_t s;
+
+ ret = onak_parse_key_material(sigkey->publickey, &pubkey);
+ if (ret != ONAK_E_OK) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanity check the length of the signature packet */
+ if (sig->length < 8) {
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Is the key the same type as the signature we're checking? */
+ if (pubkey.type != sig->data[2]) {
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PARAM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip the hashed data */
+ ofs = (sig->data[4] << 8) + sig->data[5] + 6;
+ if (sig->length < ofs + 2) {
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Skip the unhashed data */
+ ofs += (sig->data[ofs] << 8) + sig->data[ofs + 1] + 2;
+ if (sig->length < ofs + 2) {
+ ret = ONAK_E_INVALID_PKT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Skip the sig hash bytes */
+ ofs += 2;
+
+ /* Parse the actual signature values */
+ switch (sig->data[2]) {
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA:
+ mpz_init(dsasig.r);
+ mpz_init(dsasig.s);
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(sig, dsasig.r);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(sig, dsasig.s);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA:
+ mpz_init(dsasig.r);
+ mpz_init(dsasig.s);
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(sig, dsasig.r);
+ if (ret == ONAK_E_OK)
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(sig, dsasig.s);
+ mpz_export(edsig, NULL, 1, 1, 0, 0, dsasig.r);
+ mpz_export(&edsig[32], NULL, 1, 1, 0, 0, dsasig.s);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_SIGN:
+ mpz_init(s);
+ MPI_TO_MPZ(sig, s);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* If we didn't parse the signature properly then do clean-up */
+ if (ret != ONAK_E_OK)
+ goto sigerr;
+
+ /* Squash a signing only RSA key to a standard RSA key for below */
+ if (pubkey.type == OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_SIGN) {
+ pubkey.type = OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA;
+ }
+
+#define KEYHASH(key, hash) ((key << 8) | hash)
+
+ switch KEYHASH(pubkey.type, hashtype) {
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_MD5):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_WEAK_SIGNATURE : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_RIPEMD160):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ RIPEMD160_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA1):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA1X):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA1X_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA224):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA256):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA384):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA512):
+ ret = dsa_verify(&pubkey.dsa, pubkey.y,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA1):
+ ret = ecdsa_verify(&pubkey.ecc,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA256):
+ ret = ecdsa_verify(&pubkey.ecc,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA384):
+ ret = ecdsa_verify(&pubkey.ecc,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA512):
+ ret = ecdsa_verify(&pubkey.ecc,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, &dsasig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_RIPEMD160):
+ ret = ed25519_sha512_verify(pubkey.ed25519,
+ RIPEMD160_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, edsig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA256):
+ ret = ed25519_sha512_verify(pubkey.ed25519,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, edsig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA384):
+ ret = ed25519_sha512_verify(pubkey.ed25519,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, edsig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA512):
+ ret = ed25519_sha512_verify(pubkey.ed25519,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, hash, edsig) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_MD5):
+ ret = rsa_md5_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_WEAK_SIGNATURE : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_RIPEMD160):
+ ret = rsa_ripemd160_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA1):
+ ret = rsa_sha1_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA224):
+ ret = rsa_sha224_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA256):
+ ret = rsa_sha256_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA384):
+ ret = rsa_sha384_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ case KEYHASH(OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA, OPENPGP_HASH_SHA512):
+ ret = rsa_sha512_verify_digest(&pubkey.rsa, hash, s) ?
+ ONAK_E_OK : ONAK_E_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = ONAK_E_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE;
+ }
+
+sigerr:
+ switch (sig->data[2]) {
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_ECDSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_EDDSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_DSA:
+ mpz_clear(dsasig.r);
+ mpz_clear(dsasig.s);
+ break;
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA:
+ case OPENPGP_PKALGO_RSA_SIGN:
+ mpz_clear(s);
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ onak_free_key_material(&pubkey);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CRYPTO */
+
onak_status_t calculate_packet_sighash(struct openpgp_publickey *key,
struct openpgp_packet *packet,
struct openpgp_packet *sig,
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